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Carol Gilligan bas described justice and caring as 
two distinct moral frameworks or orientations to ethical 
concerns. (Gilligan 1982) The justice framework is 
characterized by abstraction, the application of general 
rules ofconduct, an emphasis on restraining aggression, 
and a concern for consistency and the fair resolution of 
conflicting claims and interests. The caring framework, 
on the other hand, is characterized by its focus on the 
concrete and particular, its emphasis on the maintenance 
and extension of connection, and by its concern for 
responsiveness and the satisfaction of needs. Animal 
liberation is often framed as a justice issue, though, I 
will suggest, it may more appropriately be understood 
in terms of caring. 
By "animal liberation" I mean opposition to 
institutions of animal exploitation such as vivisection, 
hunting, and animal farming. Two prominent 
philosophical defenders of animal liberation are Tom 
Regan and Peter Singer. Both work exclusively within 
the justice framework, presenting animal liberation as 
a matter of consistency and fair treatment, rather than 
in terms of responsiveness and the satisfaction of needs. 
We can start to see how the justice approach is ill-suited 
for animal liberation by considering the arguments of 
Regan and Singer. 
Regan attempts to move the reader from a commit­
ment to the respectful treatment of humans to a like 
commitment to the respectful treatment of normal 
adult mammals. (Regan 1983) Regan points out that 
we do not in general think it justifiable to harm one 
human to benefit others-we would object, for example, 
to killing a healthy man against hjs will in order to 
use his organs to save three sick people. We do, 
however, think it appropriate to harm one animal to 
benefit other animals, human or otherwise; at least this 
is the way that vivisection, hunting, and animal farming 
are usually justified. 
Regan argues that we are being inconsistent in 
treating humans and other mammals differently in this 
respect. The notion of inconsistency here is not self­
contradiction but contradiction with the formal principle 
of justice, according to which like individuals should 
be treated alike. Now we protect humans against being 
vivisected, fanned, or hunted, presumably because such 
treatment would harm them through the infliction of 
pain and death. But Regan has shown in the first three 
chapters of his book that pain and death are also harms 
to normal adult mammals. So these animals are just as 
deserving of protection from vivisection, farming, and 
hunting as are humans. Because both humans and other 
mammals are harmed by pain and death. the two groups 
are relevantly similar, and we are inconsistent to treat 
them so differently. 
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The flaw in this argument I wish to emphasize is the 
move from same kinds of harms to relevant similarity. 
Most of us would admit that pain and death are harms 
for both humans and other animals. But this by itself 
does not show that humans and other animals are 
relevantly similar with respect to assessing the moral 
status of these common harms. Regan allows that certain 
capacities may be unique to humans, and it is 
conceivable that the presence of uniquely human 
capacities in an individual is relevant to the justif:tability 
ofharming that individual, even when the type ofharm 
in question is one which can be imposed on nonhumans. 
In fact, according to Kantian theories, only rational 
individuals can be directly wronged. A Kantian could 
hold that killing is a harm both to humans and other 
animals, but tl:tat the wrongness of the harm arises only 
from its impingement upon the victim's rationality. 
Thus, killing a rational human would require special 
justification notneeded for killing a nonrational anin:tal, 
even though both are harmed by being killed. 
I am not saying that I agree with Kantianism or 
with the idea that there are uniquely human capacities. 
I am only saying that as long as Regan's readers are 
willing to embrace these theories, they can without 
inconsistency reject Regan's move from "death and pain 
are harms for both humans and other animals" to "killing 
and inflicting pain require the same justification for both 
humans and other animals." Since this move is crucial 
to his argument as a whole, they can consistently reject 
Regan's case for animal rights. 1 
Essentially the same type of maneuver allows 
rejection of Singer's argument for animal liberation. 
Like Regan, Singer attempts to move the reader, through 
considerations of consistency, from commitments 
concerning the appropriate treatment of humans to 
similar commitments concerning the appropriate 
treatment of animals. (Singer 1975, chapter 1) Singer 
starts not with respect for humans but with opposition 
to racism and sexism. Singer argues that anyone who 
opposes racism and sexism does so on the basis of a 
principle of equal consideration, according to which 
we must give equal consideration to the interests of all 
people, regardless of their race or sex. But animals, at 
least all those capable of feeling pleasure or pain, have 
interests, so there is no reason, according to Singer, 
why they should be excluded from the scope of this 
principle of equal consideration. But animal farming 
and vivisection, Singer maintains, are considered 
acceptable practices only because we tend to give the 
interests of nonhumans much less consideration than 
the similar interests of humans. This devaluation of 
interests solely on the basis of species Singer calls 
"speciesism," and he thinks his argument shows that 
we are inconsistent to oppose sexism and racism but 
not speciesism. 
As with Regan, however, anyone willing to accept 
a Kantian view can reject Singer's entire argument 
without inconsistency. Singer presumes tl:tat opposition 
to sexism and racism must be based on the principle of 
equal consideration of interests. One could maintain, 
however, that sexism and racism are objectionable 
because they are disrespectful of the rationality of 
members of the oppressed races and sex. One could 
then consistently exclude nonhumans from moral 
consideration, by holding tl:tat they lack the rational 
capacities of humans. 
Again I emphasize that I am not endorsing 
Kantianism here. I am just showing that Regan's and 
Singer's arguments fail on their own terms. Both writers 
insist that they are relying on reason alone, and not 
emotion, to establish their animal liberationist 
conclusions. But the crucial step in their arguments, 
tl:tat humans and other animals are relevantly similar, 
cannot be established by reason alone. 
Regan and Singer have the following response for 
Kantian rebuttals of their arguments. (see Singer 1975, 
Regan 1979, Singer 1990) Taking rationality as a 
necessary condition for moral considerability does give 
one permission toharm animals (if rationality is defined 
narrowly enough). But it also gives permission to harm 
many nonrational humans, such as infants, mentally 
retarded individuals, and people with brain damage or 
in comas. Thus, a commitment to protect these so-called 
"marginal cases" of humanity entails the rejection of 
Kantianism and the adoption of some more inclusive 
criterion of considerability. But any criterion broad 
enough to include marginal humans (e.g., sentience or 
subjectivity) will also include nonhuman animals and 
thus support animal liberation. 
This line of thought, called "the argument from 
marginal cases," is no more successful than Regan's 
and Singer's main arguments in proving that animals 
have rights. On the one hand, the argument may be 
circumvented simply by giving up the commitment to 
protectmarginal humans. R. G. Frey does this. He takes 
the marginal cases argument to present a dilemma: either 
oppose animal vivisection or condone the vivisection 
of marginal humans. (Frey 1983:97) He then reasons: 
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[V]ery few people indeed would look in the 
face the benefits which medical research in 
particular has conferred upon us, benefits 
which on the whole have most certainly 
involved vivisections .... [11berefore, we may 
fmd ourselves unable to make the choice in 
favour of antivivisectionism .... Accordingly, 
we are left with human experiments. I think 
this is how I would choose, not with great glee 
and rejoicing, and with great reluctance; but 
if this is the price we must pay. to bold the 
appeal to benefit and to enjoy the benefits 
which that appeal licenses, then we must, I 
think, pay it. (Frey 1983:97) 
Frey forgets that "we" academics, presumably 
(hopefully?) escaping classification as marginal, would 
not be the ones to pay the real price for a choice in 
favor of vivisection. 
Even those ofus not quite able to match Frey's noble 
sacrifice of other humans to vivisection can still 
consistently evade the marginal cases argument, if we 
are so inclined. Suppose we '1ustify" the vivisection of 
animals by reference to their supposed lack ofrationality. 
And suppose we allow that some humans also lack this 
rationality. This does not imply that we must vivisect 
marginal humans, only that we may. Thus, the protection 
of marginal humans could be made consistent with the 
vivisection ofanimals possessing comparable degrees 
of rationality by interpreting that protection as 
supererogatory. According to this line ofthought we may 
vivisect marginal humans, because, like nonhuman 
animals, they lack a right to protection, butfor nonbinding 
reasons we decide only to vivisect the nonhuman animals. 
This stratagem is employed by Bonnie Steinbock: 
I am willing to admit that my horror at the 
thOught of experiments being performed on 
severely mentally incapacitated human 
beings in cases in which I would find it 
justifiable and preferable to perform the same 
experiments on non-human animals (capable 
of similar suffering) may not be a moral 
emotion. But it is certainly not wrong of us to 
extend special care to members of our own 
species. (Steinbock 1978:256) 
So like their main arguments, Regan's and Singer's 
backup argument from marginal cases fails to show 
any unavoidable inconsistency in supporting the 
exploitation of animals in vivisection and in farming 
while rejecting any similar exploitation of humans. 
Animal liberation is not a matter of consistency. 
As arguments, justice-based approaches to animal 
liberation fail. The justice orientation also fails to 
capture the moral outlooks of many in the animal 
liberation movement. Justice-oriented writers cast the 
issue as, fundamentally, a comparison between the 
treatment ofhumans and the treatment ofother animals. 
According to Regan, we harm animals to benefit others, 
we do not do this to humans (generally speaking), but 
there is no relevant difference between humans and 
animals to justify the dissimilar treatment. Thus animals 
are treated unfairly by comparison to the treatment of 
humans. For Singer, the comparative unfairness is in 
opposing sexism and racism but not opposing 
speciesism, when again there is no relevant difference 
between humans and other anim~ls to support the 
distinction. For both Regan and Singer, and other writers 
within the justice framework, the basic moral judgment 
concerns the discrepancy between the treatment of 
humans and the treatment ofother similar animals. What 
is called into question is the fairness, or what they more 
often refer to as the consistency, ofa society which treats 
two relevantly similar groups of individuals in such 
totally different ways. 
The emphasis on the consistency of the agent and 
the focus on comparing the treatment of humans and 
the treatment of other animals are quite distant from 
my motivations and those of others in the animal 
liberation movement. My opposition to the institu­
tionalized exploitation of animals is not based on a 
comparison between human and animal treatment but 
on a consideration of the abuse of the animals by itself. 
I respond directly to the needs and the plight of the 
animals used in vivisection, bunting and farming. In 
objecting to these practices I am not comparing the 
treatment of humans and animals and thinking "this is 
unfair because humans are protected from such usage." 
I am appalled by the abuses in aud of themselves­
shooting, trapping, and poisoning; branding, castrating, 
forcibly impregnating, separating mother and young, 
tail docking, debeaking, confining, transporting in cattle 
cars, and slaughtering; burning, cutting, gassing, 
starving, asphyxiating, decapitating, decompressing, 
irradiating, electrocuting, freezing, crushing, paralyzing, 
amputating, excising organs, removing parts of the 
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brain, socially isolating, inducing addiction, and 
imposing disease-these acts are repellant because of 
what they do to the animals. My moral condemnation 
of the acts arises directly from my sympathy for the 
animals, and is independent of the question of 
whether humans are protected from such abuse. To 
the extent that humans are also treated in these ways I 
object to that, too, but again, out of sympathy and not 
considerations of fairness. 
Let me give some examples of discourse which 
clearly show the sort of direct responsiveness I am 
talking about. A 1983 study on the psychology of 
slaughter contains quotes from college students who 
worked on a farm as part of their curriculum. One 
19-year-old woman wrote: 
The first time 1went into the slaughter room I 
had just haltered and pulled a steer into the 
waiting line. I could tell that the steer sensed 
what was going to happen to him. He was 
doing anything to get away. Then when I 
walked to the slaughter.room I was amazed at 
the amount of blood. It was an awful feeling 
to look at that steer with its eyes open and his 
feet pointing up, so I had to look at the ceiling. 
Mr._ told me to cut off the head with a saw. 
I couldn't do it so I left. I guess slaughtering 
affects me more than the usual person because 
I raised calves for 4-H at home and became 
. quite attached to them-but I don~ butcher 
them. (Herzog & McGee 1983:129-30) 
A 19-year-old man wrote: 
It's pretty gross. I don't like having the dry 
heaves all day. Plus, I feel really bad for the 
cow. It's bad seeing a big animal turned into 
hamburger. (Herzog & McGee 1983: 130) 
The reactions described here are not comparative 
judgments of justice such as, "cutting off this steer's 
head is wrong because we don't do that to humans," 
but, rather, revulsion at bloodshed, pity for an animal 
struggling for his life, memories of animal friends, a 
sense of the loss and the waste of "a big animal turned 
into hamburger"--all elements of caring. Now these 
students do not identify themselves as animal 
liberationists, but the reactions they describe do not 
differ essentially from the reactions on which animal 
liberation is often based. Consider the following 
statements by people who do support animal liberation, 
either partially or completely: 
[T]he production-line maintenance ofanimals, 
... is without a doubt one of the darkest and 
most shameful chapters in human culture. If 
you have ever stood before a stable where 
animals are being fattened and have heard 
hundreds of calves bleating, if you can 
understand the calf's cry for help, then you 
will have had enough of those people who 
derive profit from it. 
I eat meat but rarely veal ... I could never 
bring myself to slaughter a cow. This is very 
difficult to do to any animal that one bas taken 
care of for a long time. (Lorenz 1988:113) 
Ninety percent of all pigs are now raised in 
indoor, near-dark, windowless confinement 
sheds.... I respond on an emotional level with 
horror at what each individual pig is subjected 
to and sympathize with each pig, whose 
extreme sociability is evidenced by these 
animals' increased popularity as pets .... As a 
lactating mother, I empathize with the sow 
whose reproductive freedoms have been 
denied and whose nursing experience seems 
so wretched. As a consumer and a vegetarian, 
I visualize this information when I witness 
people buying or eating "bam," "bacon," or 
"sausage." (Adams 1991:134) 
I was one morning, while studying alone in 
the Natural History Museum, suddenly 
disturbed by a frightful burst of screams, of a 
character more distressing than words can 
convey, proceeding from some chamber on 
another side of the building. I called the porter 
in charge of the museum, and asked him what 
it meant. He replied with a grin, "It is only the 
dogs being vivisected in Monsieur Beclard's 
laboratory." ... Therewith he left me, and I sat 
down alone and listened. Much as I had heard 
and said, and even written, before that day 
about vivisection, I found myself then for the 
first time in its actual presence, and there swept 
over me a wave of such extreme mental 
anguish that my heart stood still under it.. .. 
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And then and there, burying my face in my 
hands, with tears ofagony I prayed for strength 
and courage to labour effectually for the 
abolition of so vile a wrong, and to do at least 
what one heart and voice might to root this 
curse of torture from the land. (Anna 
Kingsford, quoted in Vyvyan 1988:122-23) 
No comparisons ofhuman and animal treatment, or 
fixation on one's own consistency; upon seeing or 
hearing how the animals are abused, there is an 
immediate reaction directed against that treatment, 
and based on that reaction, a moral judgment and 
decision to act. 
In response to the criticism that their justice 
approach misses the fundamental importance of direct 
sympathetic responsiveness in the actual motivations 
of activists, Regan and Singer could point out that their 
work is not descriptive but nonnative, that is, that they 
are not trying to describe animal rights activists and 
their psyches (ala Susan Sperling (1988) or Keith Tester 
(1991)) but, rather, to set out the best reasons we have 
for accepting the animal rights position. Such a response 
would be inadequate in two ways. First, it is doubtful 
that justice-based arguments do present the best reasons 
for animal liberation, given that those arguments are 
unsound, as I have shown above. More importantly, this 
response would incompletely characterize the projects 
Singer and Regan take for themselves, since, besides 
attempting to construct sound arguments, both writers 
explicitly indicate that they also want to further the 
animal liberation movement. This second part of their 
project, I would suggest, makes it incumbent upon them 
to attend to the actual motivations of activists. 
Arguments with little relation to the ethics of those who 
already affmn animal liberation are unlikely to bring 
new people into the movement or to help present 
activists maintain their commitment. Those of us who 
write or speak to move others should make presentations 
consonant with the real processes by which individuals 
come to reject animal farming, vivisection, and hunting. 
In fact, Regan and Singer believe that they are 
taking these processes sufficiently into account in 
constructing their justice-based arguments. Each 
believes that sympathetic responsiveness to animals 
is an insufficient basis for the development of an 
animal rights perspective in most individuals. They 
feel that justice-based argumentation, or what they call 
"reason," is necessary to augment people's sympathies. 
I will now describe why they believe this and why I 
think they are mistaken. 
Regan questions whether an ethic of care can "go 
far enough." (Regan 1991:95) He asks: 
[W]hat are the resources within the ethic of 
care that can move people to consider the 
ethics of their dealings with individuals who 
stand outside the existing circle of their valued 
interpersonal relationships?... [U]nless we 
supplement the ethic of care with some other 
motivating force-some other grounding of 
our moral judgment-we run the grave risk 
that our ethic will be excessive} y conservative 
and will blind us to those obligations we have 
to people for whom we are indifferent 
Nowhere, perhaps, is this possibility more 
evident than in the case of our moral dealings 
with nonhuman animals. The plain fact is, most 
people do not care very much about what 
happens to them .... 
And thus it is that a feminist ethic that is 
limited to an ethic of care will, I think, be 
unable to illuminate the moral significance of 
the idea that we (human) animals are not 
superiortoallotheranimals. (Regan 1991:95-6) 
To remedy this supposed limitation ofthe caring approach 
Regan suggests the marshalling of "consistency" 
arguments such as those I have already discussed. 
Singer does "not think that an appeal to sympathy 
and goodheartedness alone will convince most people 
ofthe wrongness of speciesism." (Singer 1975:255) He 
places his distrust of the caring approach within a 
sociobiological framework. In The Expanding Circle 
(Singer 1981), be argues that humans are disposed 
towards kin altruism, reciprocal altruism, and group 
altruism, and that these dispositions can be explained 
in evolutionary terms. Singer sees the capacity to reason 
and the practice of reason-giving as evolving 
independently of the evolution of our sympathetic 
dispositions. Reason, however, can act to override 
narrow sympathies, to expand our considemtion beyond 
that yielded by kin, reciprocal, and group altruism. 
Singer argues that 
altruistic impulses once limited to one's kin 
and one's own group might be extended to 
a wider circle by reasoning creatures who 
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c a n  s e e  t h a t  t h e y  a n d  t h e i r  k i n  a r e  o n e  g r o u p  
a m o n g  o t h e r s ,  a n d  f r o m  a n  i m p a r t i a l  p o i n t  
o f  v i e w  n o  m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  t h a n  o t h e r s .  
( S i n g e r  1 9 8 1 : 1 3 4 )  
S o ,  f o r  S i n g e r ,  h u m a n s  h a v e  e v o l v e d  i n s t i n c t i v e  
c a p a c i t i e s  t o  r e s p o n d  s y m p a t h e t i c a l l y  o n l y  t o  a  f e w  
i n d i v i d u a l s  c l o s e l y  s i m i l a r  t o  o r  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  
t h e m s e l v e s .  T h e r e f o r e  r e a s o n ,  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  t h e  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  e q u a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  i n t e r e s t s ,  m u s t  b e  
a p p l i e d  f o r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  t o  b e  e x t e n d e d  t o  o t h e r  c l a n s ,  
r a c e s ,  a n d  s p e c i e s .  
G i v e n  t h e i r  l o w  e s t i m a t i o n  o f  t h e  h u m a n  c a p a c i t y  
t o  s y m p a t h i z e  w i t h  n o n h u m a n s ,  w e  c a n  u n d e r s t a n d  w h y  
R e g a n  a n d  S i n g e r  m i g h t  f e e l  t h a t  t h e i r  j u s t i c e - o r i e n t e d  
a p p r o a c h e s  t o  a n i m a l  l i b e r a t i o n  a r e  e s s e n t i a l .  I f p e o p l e  
d o  n o t  c a r e  f o r  a n i m a l s ,  t h e n  s u p p o r t e r s  o f  a n i m a l  
l i b e r a t i o n  c a n n o t  p r e s u m e  t h a t  s u c h  a f f e c t i o n s  a r e  
p r e s e n t  i n  t h o s e  t h e y  a r e  t r y i n g  t o  p e r s u a d e .  A t  b e s t ,  
t h e y  c a n  a s s u m e  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  s o m e  c o n c e r n  f o r  
h u m a n s  a n d  u s e  t h i s  c o n c e r n  a s  a  f u l c r u m ,  t r y i n g  t o  
i m p e l  t h e i r  i n t e r l o c u t o r s  t o  a n i m a l  l i b e r a t i o n  t h r o u g h  
c h a r g e s  o f i n c o n s i s t e n c y .  T h i s  i s  p r e c i s e l y  R e g a n ' s  a n d  
S i n g e r ' s  j u s t i c e - b a s e d  s t r a t e g y .  
N o w ,  I  c a n  u n d e r s t a n d  h o w  o n e  m i g h t  c o n c l u d e  
t h a t  p e o p l e  d o  n o t  c a r e  a b o u t  a n i m a l s ,  g i v e n  t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  s u c h  h o r r e n d o u s  i n s t i t u t i o n s  a s  v i v i ­
s e c t i o n ,  f a c t o r y  f a r m i n g ,  a n d  s p o r t  b u n t i n g .  R e g a n ' s  
a n d  S i n g e r ' s  a c c o u n t s ,  h o w e v e r ,  i n v o l v e  a n  o v e r l y  
s i m p l i s t i c  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  p e o p l e ' s  
s y m p a t h i e s .  F o r  R e g a n  i t  i s  a  " p l a i n  f a c t "  t h a t  p e o p l e  
d o  n o t  c a r e  a b o u t  a n i m a l s ,  w h i l e  f o r  S i n g e r  i t  i s  a  
g e n e t i c  f a c t .  O n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  I  c o n t e n d  t h a t  t h i s  s t a t e  
o f  a f f a i r s  i s  n o t  " p l a i n "  b u t  r a t h e r  o r n a t e ,  a n d  i t  i s  n o t  
g e n e t i c  b u t  s o c i a l l y  c o n s t r u c t e d .  A n i m a l  e x p l o i t a t i o n  
t h r i v e s  n o t  b e c a u s e  p e o p l e  f a i l  t o  c a r e  b u t  i n  s p i t e  o f  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e y  d o  c a r e .  
T h e  d i s p o s i t i o n  t o  c a r e  f o r  a n i m a l s  i s  n o t  t h e  
u n r e l i a b l e  q u i r k  o f a  f e w ,  b u t  i s ,  r a t h e r ,  t h e  n o r m a l  s t a t e  
o f  h u m a n s  g e n e r a l l y .  A s A n d r e e  C o l l a r d  p u t s  i t :  " O u r  
c o m m o n  b o n d  w i t h  a n i m a l s  i s  n a t u r a l  ( o f  n a t u r e ) ,  
n o r m a l  ( o f  t h e  n o r m ) ,  a n d  h e a l t h y  ( w h o l e s o m e ) . "  
( C o l l a r d  1 9 8 9 : 7 0 )  I f  w e  s h i f t  o u r  a t t e n t i o n  a w a y  f r o m  
a n i m a l  e x p l o i t a t i o n  t o  o t h e r  c u l t u r a l  p h e n o m e n a ,  w e  
c a n  s e e  t h e  s t r e n g t h  a n d  d e p t h  o f  t h e  h u m a n - a n i m a l  
b o n d .  I  w i l l  j u s t  m e n t i o n  f o u r  e x a m p l e s .  
( 1 )  P e t - k e e p i n g .  T h e  p r a c t i c e  o f  k e e p i n g  a n i m a l s  a s  
c o m p a n i o n s ,  i n  i t s  c r o s s - c u l t u r a l  p r e v a l e n c e  a n d  
i t s  f r e q u e n t l y  a v i d  p u r s u i t ,  d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h e  
s t r e n g t h  a n d  d e p t h  o f  h u m a n  i n t e r e s t  i n  a n d  
a f f e c t i o n  f o r  n o n h u m a n  a n i m a l s .  A p p r o x i m a t e l y  
h a l f o f a l l  c o n t e m p o r a r y  A m e r i c a n s  a n d  E u r o p e a n s  
h a v e  p e t s  a t  a n y  g i v e n  t i m e .  M a n y  t h e o r i e s  o f  p e t ­
k e e p i n g  d o w n p l a y  a f f e c t i o n a l  t i e s ,  i n s t e a d  
c h a r a c t e r i z i n g  p e t s  a s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  s t a t u s  s y m b o l s  
o r  o b j e c t s  o f d o m i n a t i o n .  W h i l e  t h i s  m a y  a c c u r a t e l y  
c h a r a c t e r i z e  s o m e  h u m a n - p e t  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  
c o m p a n i o n s h i p  a n d  a f f e c t i o n  a r e  b y  f a r  t h e  m o s t  
i m p o r t a n t  e l e m e n t s  m o t i v a t i n g  p e t - k e e p i n g  i n  o u r  
s o c i e t y .  I n  o n e  s u r v e y ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  p e t - o w n e r s  
r a n k e d  c o m p a n i o n s h i p ,  l o v e  a n d  a f f e c t i o n ,  a n d  
p l e a s u r e ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  a s  t h e  t o p  t h r e e  " a d v a n t a g e s "  
o f  o w n i n g  a  p e t .  ( Q u i g l e y ,  e t  a / 1 9 8 3 : 2 7 1 )  A n d  a s  
J a m e s  S e r p e l l  h a s  s h o w n ,  t h e  c o m m o n  p r a c t i c e  o f  
p e t - k e e p i n g  a m o n g  t r i b a l  c u l t u r e s ,  l i k e  p e t - k e e p i n g  
i n  i n d u s t r i a l  E u r o p e  a n d  A m e r i c a ,  i s  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  
b y  s t r o n g  a f f e c t i o n  f o r  p e t s ,  g r e a t  e f f o r t s  t o  k e e p  
p e t s ,  a n d  v i e w s  o f  p e t s  a s  f a m i l y  a n d  c o m m u n i t y  
m e m b e r s .  ( S e r p e l l 1 9 8 6 ,  c h a p t e r  4 )  
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(2) Therapy. Many people either socially withdrawn or 
in depressed states have been helped through the 
companionship of animals. These people were 
unable to interact positively with other humans 
but could establish a connection with a friendly 
animal, often a dog or a cat. (see Beck & Katcher 
1983, chapter 8) This reinforces what most of us 
already recognize, that bonds with animals are 
sometimes easier to establish and maintain than 
bonds with humans. 
(3) Rescue. You may recall from 1988 the plight of three 
California gray whales off the coast of Point Barrow, 
Alaska. The ice-boles through which the whales 
were surfacing to breathe were in the process of 
freezing over; which would result in the whales 
drowning. A rescue attempt was mounted, which 
ultimately cost $5.8 million and directly involved 
all the following: local subsistence whalers, 
professional biologists, environmental activists, 150 
journalists, the oil industry, U.S. National Guard, 
and the American and Soviet federal governments. 
(Rose 1989) If we ask why the rescue was pursued 
atsuch great lengths, a cynical answer in terms of 
the self-interest of the participants would be to some 
extent correct But to leave it at that would give a 
very superficial and distorted understanding of the 
final cause of the rescue. The participation of these 
groups in the whales' rescue served their interests 
only by virtue of a deep and widespread concern 
for the whales' well-being among people generally. 
The media, for example, cannot play to emotions 
people do not have: whale rescues boost ratings 
because people care about whales, especially whales 
that have become individualized through their 
special circumstances. 
(4) Expiation. James Serpell describes the almost 
universal presence, in cultures which hunt or 
slaughter animals, ofmechanisms for mediating the 
guilt which such exploitation engenders. (Serpell 
1986: chapters 10 and 11) Mechanisms which 
soothe the consciences of those who harm animals 
take many forms. Consider the following: many 
African tribes perform elaborate cleansing and 
purification ceremonies after killing an animal, 
others apologize to the slain (Serpell 1986:145); 
ancient Babylonian priests, as part of the rite of 
animal sacrifice, would whisper in the slangbtered 
victim's ear: "This deed was done by all the gods; I 
did not do it" (168); the Nuer people of the Sudan 
justify their consumption of cattle blood by claiming 
that periodic bleeding is beneficial to the animals' 
health (153), while the Ainu of Japan also claim to 
benefit the bears they eat, by maintaining that bears 
want to return to the spirit realm from which they 
came (148). Western civilization bas its own 
expiatory myths, most outstandingly the biblical 
fable of divinely granted dominion over animals, 
and the scientific denial of animal subjectivity 
(originally expressed as Cartesian animal autom­
atism, now more circumspectly maintained as 
operational behaviorism). 
All these rituals and myths serve in some way to 
reduce the guilt-feelings of those who harm animals. 
The general occurrence of guilt-mediating mechanisms 
around systems of animal exploitation contradicts the 
notion that humans are naturally ~ndifferent toward 
animal welfare. People are generally inclined against 
harming animals: otherwise, there would be no need 
for social mechanisms which make killing somewhat 
more bearable-the exploitation of animals would be 
as psychologically straightforward as, say, drinking 
water or breathing air. 
Attention to social phenomena such as pet-keeping, 
animal rescues, therapeutic human-animal relationships, 
and the ubiquity of expiatory mechanisms around 
animal exploitation brings a realization of the depth 
of the human-animal connection. This realization 
shifts the question, from Regan's and Singer's "How 
can we get people to oppose animal exploitation, given 
that they don't care?" to "How does animal exploi­
tation continue, given that people do care?'' The 
answer I would give to this latter question is that 
animal exploitation continues with great difficulty. 
Enormous amounts of social energy are expended to 
forestall, undermine, and override our sympathies for 
animals, so that vivisection, animal farming, and sport 
bunting can continue. 
Let me mention just a few of the myriad practices 
our society has developed to overcome opposition to 
harming animals. 
There is a great deal of concealment and distortion 
of what is done to animals in laboratories and on farms. 
Vivisectors self-consciously conceal the effects of their 
activities from the public, through such measures as 
removing the vocal cords of vivisected dogs (so their 
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J u s t i c e ,  
a n d  A n i m a l  L i b e r a t i o n  
t o r t u r e d  h o w l i n g  d o e s  n o t  a t t r a c t  s y m p a t h y )  a n d  
d i s p o s i n g  o f  c a r c a s s e s  s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y .  S p e c i a l  
t e r m i n o l o g y  b l u n t s  a w a r e n e s s  o f  w h a t  i s  d o n e ,  s u c h  a s  
" t e r m i n a t e , "  " d i s p a t c h , "  a n d  " s a c r i f i c e "  f o r  k i l l i n g .  T h e  
m e a t  i n d u s t r y  a l s o  e m p l o y s  e u p h e m i s m s ,  p r e f e r r i n g ,  f o r  
e x a m p l e ,  " m e a t - p a c k i n g "  t o  " s l a u g h t e r i n g . "  A n d  t h e  
i m a g e s  o f  f a r m  l i f e  p r e s e n t e d  i n  a d v e r t i s i n g  a n d  
c h i l d r e n ' s  b o o k s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  s h o w  c o n t e n t e d  a n i m a l s  
l i v i n g  i n  h a r m o n y  w i t h  h u m a n  g u a r d i a n s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  
t h e  n i g h t m a r i s h  r e a l i t y  o f  t h e  f a c t o r y  f a r m  a n d  t h e  
s l a u g h t e r h o u s e .  
B e y o n d  o b s c u r i n g  w h a t  i s  d o n e  t o  a n i m a l s ,  t h e r e  
a r e  a l s o  s o c i a l  m e c h a n i s m s  f o r  n e g a t i n g  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  
o f  t h e  a n i m a l s  t h e m s e l v e s .  I  h a v e  a l r e a d y  m e n t i o n e d  
t h e  d e n i a l  o f  a n i m a l  s u b j e c t i v i t y  w h i c h  h a s  b e c o m e  
i n t r i n s i c  t o  s c i e n t i f i c  " o b j e c t i v i t y . "  O u r  e v e r y d a y  
l a n g u a g e  a l s o  r e m o v e s  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  o f  
e x p l o i t e d  a n i m a l s  f r o m  a w a r e n e s s ,  t h r o u g h  t e r m s  s u c h  
a s  " l i v e s t o c k "  ( m e a n i n g  " a n i m a l s  . . .  f o r  s a l e  a n d  
p r o f i t " - W e b s t e r ' s  U n a b r i d g e d  D i c t i o n a r y ) ,  a n d  
" g a m e "  ( " a n i m a l s  . . .  p u r s u e d  o r  k i l l e d  i n  s p o r t " ) .  
A n i m a l s  r e f e r r e d  t o  b y  s u c h  t e r m s  h a v e  c o m e  t o  b e  
d e f i n e d  s o l e l y  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  t h e i r  h u m a n  
e x p l o i t e r s .  I t  i s  n o w  o f  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  a  " g u i n e a  p i g "  t o  
b e  v i v i s e c t e d .  T h i s  d e n i a l  o f t h e  a n i m a l ' s  o w n  p u r p o s e s  
i s  s o m e t i m e s  p u r p o s e f u l l y  a d v o c a t e d :  
F o r g e t  t h e  p i g  i s  a n  a n i m a l .  T r e a t  h i m  j u s t  l i k e  
a  m a c h i n e  i n  a  f a c t o r y .  S c h e d u l e  t r e a t m e n t s  
l i k e  y o u  w o u l d  l u b r i c a t i o n .  B r e e d i n g  s e a s o n  
l i k e  t h e  f i r s t  s t e p  i n  a n  a s s e m b l y  l i n e .  A n d  
m a r k e t i n g  l i k e  t h e  d e l i v e r y  o f f i n i s h e d  g o o d s .  
( H o g  F a r m  M a n a g e m e n t ,  S e p t .  1 9 7 6 .  Q u o t e d  
i n  M a s o n  a n d  S i n g e r  1 9 9 0 : 1 )  
A p a r t  f r o m  d e v i c e s  w h i c h  p r e v e n t  s y m p a t h y ,  s u c h  
a s  d e n y i n g  a n i m a l  s u b j e c t i v i t y  o r  c o v e r i n g  u p  b o w  
a n i m a l s  a r e  h a r m e d ,  t h e r e  a r e  a l s o  s o c i a l  m e c h a n i s m s  
f o r  o v e r r i d i n g  t h o s e  s y m p a t h i e s  w h i c h  d o  b e c o m e  
e n g a g e d .  P e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t  p o t e n t  o f  t h e s e  i s  t h e  
m y t h  o f  n e c e s s i t y - t h e  i d e a  t h a t  w e  m u s t  e x p l o i t  
a n i m a l s  f o r  o u r  o w n  w e l l - b e i n g .  B o t h  t h e  m e a t  i n d u s t r y  
a n d  t h e  v i v i s e c t i o n  i n d u s t r y  a c t i v e l y  p r o m o t e  t h e  
n o t i o n  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  s e r v i n g  e s s e n t i a l  h u m a n  i n t e r e s t s .  
T h e i r  l a r g e l y  f a l s e  t e a c h i n g s - t h a t  h u m a n  h e a l t h  
d e p e n d s  u p o n  p r o g r a m s  o f  a n i m a l  v i v i s e c t i o n ,  a n d  
t h a t  m e a t ,  e g g s ,  a n d  d a i r y  p r o d u c t s  a r e  g o o d  f o r  
y o u - g e n e r a t e  t h e  k i n d  o f  f e a r  t h a t  p r e v e n t s  e v e n  
t h o s e  d i s t u r b e d  b y  t h e  h a r m s  d o n e  t o  f a r m e d  a n d  
- - - - · - - - - - - , - - - ­
v i v i s e c t e d  a n i m a l s  f r o m  t a k i n g  a  p o l i t i c a l  s t a n d  a g a i n s t  
a n i m a l  e x p l o i t a t i o n .
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F i n a l l y ,  n u m e r o u s  s y s t e m s  o f  r e w a r d  a n d  p u n i s h ­
m e n t  i n s u r e  t h a t  c o m p l i c i t y  w i t h  a n i m a l  e x p l o i t a t i o n  
t a k e s  p r e c e d e n c e  o v e r  c o m p a s s i o n .  C h i l d r e n  w h o  a r e  
a g h a s t  a t  d i s c o v e r i n g  t h e  t r u e  o r i g i n  o f m e a t  a r e  f o r c e d  
b y  t h e i r  p a r e n t s  t o  c o n t i n u e  e a t i n g  t h e  d e a d  f l e s h ;  
a s p i r i n g  v i v i s e c t o r s  f m d  t h a t  t h e  l u r e  o f  p r o f e s s i o n a l  
a c c l a i m  a n d  f i n a n c i a l  c o m f o r t  o v e r c o m e s  t h e i r  i n i t i a l  
i n h i b i t i o n s  a g a i n s t  k i l l i n g  a n d  i m p o s i n g  d i s e a s e ;  a n d  
s l a u g h t e r h o u s e  e m p l o y e e s ,  h a t i n g  e v e r y  m i n u t e  o n  t h e  
j o b ,  s t o m a c h  i t  w h e n  n o  o t h e r  j o b s  p a y  d e c e n t  w a g e s .  
( s e e  T h o m p s o n  1 9 8 3 )  
T o  s u m  u p :  J u s t i c e - b a s e d  a r g u m e n t s  f o r  a n i m a l  
l i b e r a t i o n  f a i l .  B u t  m y  o w n  e x p e r i e n c e  a n d  t h e  r e p o r t s  
o f  o t h e r s  l e a d  m e  t o  b e l i e v e  t h a t  d i r e c t  r e s p o n s i v e n e s s  
t o  n e e d  i s  m o r e  c e n t r a l  t o  a n i m a l  l i b e r a t i o n i s m  t h a n  
c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  c o n s i s t e n c y  a n y w a y .  A n d  c o n t r a r y  t o  
t h e  s u p p o s i t i o n s  o f j u s t i c e - o r i e n t e d  w r i t e r s ,  t h e  c a p a c i t y  
t o  r e s p o n d  t o  a n i m a l s  i s  a  d e e p  a n d  r e c u r r i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  
h u m a n s .  T h a t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  w h y  s o c i e t i e s  w h i c h  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e  a n i m a l  e x p l o i t a t i o n  m u s t  a n d  d o  f i n d  
w a y s  t o  o v e r r i d e  o u r  s y m p a t h e t i c  c a p a c i t i e s ,  o r  t o  
p r e v e n t  t h e i r  a c t u a l i z a t i o n .  
T h e  l e s s o n  I  d r a w  f r o m  t h i s  a n a l y s i s  i s  t w o f o l d ,  p a r t  
h e a r t e n i n g  a n d  p a r t  s o b e r i n g .  H e a r t e n i n g  i s  t h e  
r e a l i z a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  e t h i c a l  b a s i s  o f  a n i m a l  l i b e r a t i o n  i s  
v e r y  s i m p l e  a n d  g e n e r a l l y  m o v i n g .  A  s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  
p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  w h a t  t h e  a n i m a l s  a r e  l i k e  a n d  w h a t  i s  
d o n e  t o  t h e m  o n  t h e  f a r m s  a n d  i n  t h e  l a b s  c a n  s t i r  p e o p l e ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  i f  t h e  i d e o l o g i e s  w h i c h  b l o c k  s y m p a t h y  a r e  
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  d e b u n k e d .  
B u t  s o b e r i n g  i s  a  g r a s p  o f  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  
f o r c e s  a l l i e d  a g a i n s t  a  t r u e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f a n i m a l s ,  a g a i n s t  
a n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  w h a t  i s  d o n e  t o  t h e m ,  a g a i n s t  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a c t i n g  f r o m  c o m p a s s i o n .  T h e  s u b s t a n t i a l  
p o w e r  o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d  a n i m a l  e x p l o i t a t i o n  s u s t a i n s  
i g n o r a n c e ,  p r o m o t e s  f e a r ,  r e w a r d s  c r u e l t y ,  a n d  p u n i s h e s  
k i n d n e s s .  S o ,  t h o u g h  t h e  e t h i c s  o f a n i m a l  l i b e r a t i o n  a r e  
i n h e r e n t l y  a p p e a l i n g ,  t h e  o b s t a c l e s  p l a c e d  i n  t h e  w a y  
o f  r a d i c a l  s o c i a l  c h a n g e  b a s e d  o n  s y m p a t h y  a r e  
d a u n t i n g .  T h i s  i s  n o t  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h o s e  o b s t a c l e s  a r e  
i n s u r m o u n t a b l e .  M o v i n g  a w a y  f r o m  u n s o u n d  a n d  
i r r e l e v a n t  j u s t i c e - b a s e d  a r g u m e n t s ,  t a k i n g  i n s t e a d  a  
c a r i n g  p e r s p e c t i v e  w h i c h  e x p e c t s  a  h u m a n - a n i m a l  b o n d ,  
a n d  w h i c h  c h a l l e n g e s  a n y  h i n d r a n c e s  t o  t h i s  n a t u r a l ,  
n o r m a l ,  a n d  h e a l t h y  b o n d ,  a l l o w s  u s  t o  c o n t i n u e  m o v i n g  
t o w a r d  a  s o c i e t y  i n  w h i c h  a n i m a l s  h a v e  b e e n  l i b e r a t e d  
f r o m  h u m a n  t y r a n n y .  
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Notes 
1 I should note that Regan does not neglect this response 
to his argument: section 5.5 of his book is a rejection of 
Kantianism. Close examination, however, reveals that his 
argument against Kantianism is question-begging. See this 
author's doctoral dissertation. 
2 Convincing arguments that these are false appear in 
Sharpe (1988) and Robbins (1987). 
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